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L1M1TAT10N oF Acr10Ns - '\VHAT xs A "vVRITTEN" CoNTRAcT w1TH1N
STATUTE? - Plaintiff sued on a clause in a deed in which the grantee assumed
and agreed to pay a mortgage indebtedness therein specified. This obligation in
the deed, being unsigned by the party to be charged, was held to be an unwritten contract by the lower court, and therefore barred by the six-year statute
of limitations. Plaintiff appealed. Held, the contract, though unsigned by the
party to be charged, was "in writing," and therefore the statutory fifteen-year
period of limitations 1 applied. McCormick '11. Taft, (Ohio App. 1938) 22
N. E. (2d) 510.
In the light of the foregoing case, it is interesting to inquire as to what in
general are the essential characteristics of the writing required to bring a particular case within that part of the statute of limitations which deals with
"written" contracts. The several state statutes are by no means uniform, either
as regards the period of years allowed for bringing an action on a "written"
contract, or as to the time allowed for suing on parol contracts.2 The average
time limit prescribed in all of the states and the District of Columbia is approximately six and one-half years for contracts in writing,-four and onehalf years for contracts not in writing. 3 In some jurisdictions particular types
of contracts are especially provided for, followed by a general clause for all
other obligations in writing.4 Michigan, it appears, draws no general distinction
between parol and written contracts in this regard, 5 but the question is one of

1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926), § n221: "An action upon a specialty or an
agreement, contract or promise in writing shall be brought within fifteen years after
the cause thereof accrued." § II222: "An action upon a contract not in writing,
express or implied, or upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or
penalty, shall be brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued."
2 Based on a study of ten typical states-Indiana, Washington, Michigan, Wyoming, Connecticut, New York, California, Alabama, Illinois, and Ohio.
11 Mix, "State Statutes of Limitations Contrasted and Compared," 3 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 106 at II7 (1931).
4 37 C. J. 755 ( 1925).
5 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 13976.
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importance in other jurisdictions. That the writing need not be signed to bring
the case within that part of the statute which deals with written contracts is
generally agreed. 6 Thus, with the same set of facts as those in the instant case
before it for decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the acceptance of
the unsigned deed with the mortgage obligation therein was more nearly analogous to a simple contract in writing than it was to a verbal undertaking.7 Again,
in Kansas, it was held "Nor is it material that this contract is not signed by the
grantee. The acceptance of the deed makes it a contract in writing binding
upon the grantee .••." 8 It is to be observed that the "writing" requirement of
the normal statute of limitations differs from that in the statute of frauds. The
statute of frauds in terms calls for a signed writing. As regards the content of
the writing, a proposition often cited and approved by the courts as a test is
whether the agreement in writing is so complete in itself, that in order to enforce
its execution, nothing remains but to show acceptance on the party seeking to
enforce it. 9 Again it has been stated that an "instrument sued on is held to be
[ a written contract] within the statute of limitations when it provides in express
terms or by fair implication for the payment of money or property. • •• But if
evidence aliunde is necessary to establish a promise, the statute cannot be invoked." 10 In line with these assumptions it has been held that written propositions accepted in writing constitute a contract within the s_tatute; 11 that parol
acceptance of an offer in writing giving rise to an agreement will not invoke
the statute; 12 that the statute is to be construed broadly so that a promise implied
by law from whatever is written is a written contract within the longer statute
of limitations.18 From a study of these and like decisions it might be a fair
general statement that the statutory description of an action as "founded on an
instrument in writing," or equivalent phrases, refers to obligations growing
immediately out of written instruments. The decision in the principal case that
a promise to assume and pay a mortgage in a deed, though unsigned, was such
a written contract seems to be a fair and justifiable application of these principles.14 The historical basis for varying the period of limitations on written and
6

Fender v. Haseltine, 106 Mo. App. 28, 79 S. W. 1018 (1904); Reynolds v.
Johnson, 199 Iowa 1055, 202 N. W. 881 (1925); Hendricks v. Brooks, 80 Kan. 1,
101 P. 622 (1909); Baldwin v. Emery, 89 Me. 496, 36 A. 994 (1897); Roberts v.
Fitzallen, 120 Cal. 482, 52 P. 818 (1898); Huyler's Executors v. Atwood, 26 N. J.
Eq. 504 (1875); note, 10 Ohio Op. 304 (1938).
1
Atlanta, K. & N. R.R. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S. E. 701 (1905).
8 Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104 at III (1877).
9
Kincaid v. Overshiner, 171 Ill. App. 37 (1912).
10
Quint v. Kingsbury, (Mo. App. 1927) 289 S. W. 667 at 668.
11 Bauer v. Hindley, 22 Ill. 3 I 9, 78 N. E. 626 ( I 906) ; Patten v. Iroquois Furnace Co., 124 Ill. App. I (1905).
12
Wood v. Williams, 142 Ill. 269, 31 N. E. 681 (1892); Colston v. Louisville
Trust Co., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1758, 44 S. W. 377 (1898).
18
Home Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 219 Mo. App. 645, 284 S. W. 834
(1926).
14 The minority of courts holding to the contrary base their arguments on the
proposition that the grantee, though promising to pay in the body of the deed, has
not signed the document, and the promi5e is therefore parol because the contract itself

1939]

RECENT DECISIONS

2 59

oral agreements seems to be found in the feeling that a longer time within which
to bring suit may safely be given in those cases in which there is clear evidence in
permanent form. 1 ~ When such evidence in writing exists, the statute would seem
to be satisfied. To require authentication of that evidence in a particular way, as
by signing as was done by the trial court in the principal case, would seem to
be unwarranted in the absence of a specification to that effect in the statute.

is implied by acceptance of the deed. This does not appear to be strong reasoning in the
light of the "implied from written" doctrines appearing above, and from examination
of the purposes of the statutes in question. Cases contra to principal cases are: Willard
v. Wood, 164 U.S. 502, 17 S. Ct. 176 (1896); Hollister v. Strahan, 23 S. D. 570,
122 N. W. 604 (1909); Bishop v. Douglass, 25 Wis. 696 (1870); Taylor v. Forbes'
Admr., 101 Va. 658, 44 S. E. 888 (1890).
16 Homire v. Stratton & Terstegge Co., 157 Ky. 822 at 827, 164 S. W. 67
(1904).

